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This paper uses a prospective randomized trial to assess 
the impact of two school feeding schemes on health 
and education outcomes for children from low-income 
households in northern rural Burkina Faso. The two 
school feeding programs under consideration are, on 
the one hand, school meals where students are provided 
with lunch each school day, and, on the other hand, 
take-home rations that provide girls with 10 kg of 
cereal flour each month, conditional on 90 percent 
attendance rate. After running for one academic year, 
both programs increased girls’ enrollment by 5 to 6 
percentage points. While there was no observable 
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significant impact on raw scores in mathematics, the 
time-adjusted scores in mathematics improved slightly 
for girls. The interventions caused absenteeism to increase 
in households that were low in child labor supply while 
absenteeism decreased for households that had a relatively 
large child labor supply, consistent with the labor 
constraints. Finally, for younger siblings of beneficiaries, 
aged between 12 and 60 months, take-home rations have 
increased weight-for-age by ..38 standard deviations and 
weight-for-height by ..33 standard deviations. In contrast, 
school meals did not have any significant impact on the 
nutrition of younger children. 
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1 Introduction 
While universal primary school attendance  is a stated goal by many governments and the 
millennium development goals (MDGs), enrollment rates continue to be low in many developing 
countries  (e.g. UNESCO, 2007).  To foster enrollment, many governments have eliminated 
primary  school fees, as well as established programs such as school feeding food programs  (see 
Levinger, 1986, for an early review) or conditional cash transfers more recently (see Schultz, 2004, 
for an analysis of the Progresa program in Mexico) to increase the demand for schooling.  There 
exists a large body of empirical evidence which documents the effectiveness of conditional cash 
transfers to increase investment in education in different settings.  In contrast school feeding 
programs (SFPs) have received relatively less attention in recent economic literature (see Adelman 
et al., 2007, for a review). Significantly, seldom do the studies of SFPs assess the relative impact of 
different modalities of interventions; the current study addresses this gap in the literature by 
providing a rigorous evaluation of alternative school feeding schemes in the same environment.  
In general, three objectives can be directly associated with school feeding programs (e.g. 
Adelman et al., 2007; Levinger, 1986). First, SFPs can motivate parents to enroll their children and 
see that they attend school regularly.  Second, SFPs can improve the nutritional status of school 
age  children over time, and alleviate short-term hunger in malnourished or otherwise well-
nourished schoolchildren. Third, SFPs can improve cognitive functions and academic performance 
via reduced absenteeism and increased attention and concentration due to improved nutritional 
status and reduced short-term hunger. Indirectly, by increasing the amount of food available to the 
household, SFPs could improve the nutritional status of household members who are not in school, 
especially when SFPs entail take home rations.  Overall, SFPs are appealing because if properly 
designed and implemented they lead to increased number of children being enrolled with better 
academic performances.  
The two forms of SFPs that we consider consist of school meals and take-home rations 
(THR). Under school meals program breakfast and/or lunch (possibly fortified with micronutrients) 
is served at the school every school day.  Under THR a student receives a certain amount of food 
staples each period conditional on maintaining a specified attendance rate during that period.  
Each scheme of SFPs has its specific merits.  We are certain that meals served at schools   3 
reach the students who are supposed to benefit from the program.  However, parents could 
react by reallocating food in the household away from these children who are already benefiting 
from the program. Food received by the household under THR is more likely to be shared by other 
household members, hence reaching children who may be in need of additional food. Because the 
nutritional benefits would be diluted within the household, the impact on academic performance is 
likely to be  lower for THR than with a school meals program. Which program should be 
preferred is depends both on the policy objectives as well as on the evidence base.  The latter 
empirical question is addressed by this paper.  
The  paper  uses  a  randomized  experiment  to  assess  the  hypothesized  relationships  between 
SFPs on the one hand, and enrollment, academic performance, cognitive development and preschool 
children nutritional status on the other hand. The focus of this study is the Sahel region of northern 
Burkina Faso in West Africa. Northern Burkina Faso is an appropriate context to evaluate the 
impact of school feeding program for two main reasons. First, the region has some the world’s 
lowest primary school participation. On average 20 percent of school age children (6 to 16 years old) 
attend school, based on recent national surveys (e.g. Institut National de la Statistique et de la 
Démographie & ORC Macro, 2004). Therefore there exists a large scope for increasing enrollment. 
Second, income levels are very low and severe food shortages are frequent (Zoungrana et al., 1999).  
Hence, the value of the food offered should be a sufficient incentive to attract children to school.  
Our analysis adds to the literature on education in low-income countries in two ways. 
First, it rigorously evaluates the impact of two alternative school feeding schemes within the same 
context.  The use of a randomized experiment has the advantage of avoiding the issue of site 
selection that may have limited the causal interpretation of many previous studies. Hence the paper 
provides new insights on how a range of educational outcomes including enrollment, absenteeism 
and academic performances respond to two related types of interventions.  Second, in addition to 
educational outcomes, the paper also explores the impact of SFPs on the nutritional status of 
school age children as well as of younger children who are not enrolled in school. While previous 
studies have looked at the nutritional impact of school age children, none has taken into account 
the potential spillovers effects to younger children. This possibility would imply additional long-
term benefit of SFPs which may have been previously under-estimated.    4 
We find that both school meals and THR increase new enrollment for girls by about 5 to 
6 percentage points.  The interventions also led to adjustment in child labor, with children 
(especially girls) with access to SFPs shifting from on farm labor and off-farm productive labor 
to more domestic tasks, possibly those that are more compatible with school hours. We find a small 
increase in time adjusted scores of mathematics for girls, but not a significant impact on raw scores 
of mathematics. We do not find an impact on other measures of cognitive development.  
The impact on absenteeism is unexpected since students who were exposed to the 
interventions have higher absenteeism on average. We argue that the increased enrollment could be 
accompanied by higher absenteeism rates if there is no active labor market and households are labor 
constrained and/or child labor is complementary to adult labor. We show that the interventions 
caused absenteeism to increase in household who are low in child labor supply while absenteeism 
decreased for households which have a relatively large child labor supply, which is an indication 
that labor constraints matter. This in turn explains the mixed impacts on learning outcomes that we 
observed.  
Regarding nutrition, for children between 6 and 60 months who were not in school, take 
home rations have increased weight-for-height by .33 standard deviations and weight-for-age by .38 
standard deviations.  Overall, both SFPs improved enrollment, and take home rations had positive 
spillovers onto younger children.  
The paper is organized as follows.  We provide a brief review on school feeding program 
in section 2. We discuss our program design and the data collection in section 3 and our empirical 
strategy in section 4. We present the estimation results in section 5 while section 6 concludes. 
 
 
2 Overview of School Feeding Programs  
SFPs seek to induce a change in household behavior, with the goal of improving educational and 
nutritional outcomes (Grantham-McGregor, Chang, and Walker, 1998). The driving rationale is 
that by subsidizing schooling costs, school SFPs can induce parents to invest more in their children’s 
education than they would have absent of the program (e.g. Adelman, Gilligan, and Lehrer, 2007).  
Additionally, SFPs can make investments in education more efficient.  
SFPs are not new. School meals in particular have been used for a long time in developed   5 
countries  (see Dwyer, 1995, for an analysis of school feeding program since the 19
th  century in 
the US), and their introduction in low income countries dates back to at least three decades 
(Levinger, 1986).  In contrast, take-home rations are a more recent intervention that has been 
recently promoted by the World Food Program (WFP). SFPs can be perceived as conditional in-
kind transfers. School meals are conditioned in the sense that a child must be enrolled and attend 
school regularly to receive a transfer. THR can be made conditional on enrollment and attendance. 
From this perspective, SFPs are similar to conditional cash transfers which have been the focus of a 
growing body of empirical research.  
The benefits of SFPs  are, arguably, very large (Adelman, Gilligan, and Lehrer,  2007, 
Adelman et al., 2008; Ahmed, 2004). First, nutritional and health statuses have powerful influences 
on a child’s learning and on how well a child performs in school. In particular, poor nutrition 
among school-age children impacts  their cognitive functions and reduces  their ability to 
participate in learning experiences in the classroom. Second, malnourished or unhealthy children 
are likely to attend school irregularly leading to poor academic performances.  Third, it has been 
shown in the nutrition literature that even short-term hunger (common in children who do not 
eat before going to school), can have severe adverse effects on learning and academic 
performances in general. Simply stated, children who are hungry have more difficulties 
concentrating and performing complex tasks, even if otherwise well nourished. Overall, beyond 
getting parents to enroll their children, SFPs can have a far reaching impact on children 
nutritional and health status and how they perform in school. 
Few studies address some of the potentially adverse impacts of SFPs on academic 
performances.  Intuitively, the positive impacts on academic performances would require that the 
learning environment remains constant or improves when enrollment increases. One can, however, 
anticipate several changes in the learning environment following the introduction of SFPs. First, if 
teachers allocate some of their time to administering the programs, the actual teaching time could 
decrease.  Second, classrooms could become overcrowded since enrollment is likely to increase.  In 
this case the teacher may become less efficient.  Schools may find themselves lacking other inputs 
(e.g. books, notebooks) which could effectively reduce academic performances.  Moreover, the 
additional incentives of the program will bring in students whose parents previously assessed the   6 
benefits of schooling as lower than the costs; at the margin, these students can be expected to be 
less able to gain from schooling.  
There are instances where SFPs are reported to have produced mixed results on academic 
performances at best. Grantham-McGregor, Chang, and Walker  (1998) show than in Jamaica, 
learning outcomes deteriorated in not so well organized schools following the introduction of a 
school breakfast program. Ahmed and Ninno (2002) find that take home rations were effective in 
increasing enrollment and  attendance  in Bangladesh, but academic performance measured by 
standardized tests was lower than in schools that did not benefit from the program.  The authors 
note, however, that the students’ poor performance cannot be attributed to the program because 
non-eligible students in the program schools scored as well as students in schools whose schools 
were not part of the program. Adelman et al. (2008) find that the literacy scores decreased for 
some segments of their sample which were receiving the take home rations, but do not elaborate 
on the mechanisms.  
Reviewing 22 studies, Levinger (1986) concludes that SFPs do indeed increase enrollment, 
but the impact on academic performances is mixed and depends on the local conditions.  Overall, 
the conventional wisdom is that unless other factors such as adequately trained teachers, other 
learning materials and adequate physical facilities are present, SFPs would not improve academic 
performances (e.g. General Accounting Office, 2002).  
In the economic literature a long standing debate is whether in-kind transfers can be as 
efficient  as  cash transfers (e.g. Gahvari  and  Mattos, 2007).  Ross (1991) shows that in-kind 
transfers (in the absence of a resale market) may be more effective than cash transfers at raising the 
welfare of all household members when parents put insufficient weight on children welfare than 
society would have preferred. In the case under consideration, SFPs would be more effective than 
an equivalent amount of cash transfers if one thinks that parents would have put less weight than 
the society wanted on the nutritional status of their children.  
Equivalent values of school meals and THR may have different distributional impacts.  
For example, precise targeting to an individual with school meals is possible because the child who 
is enrolled and attends school is the only one receiving the meal. This targeting, however, assumes that 
households do not neutralize the benefits of the school meals to the eligible children by modifying   7 
food reallocation within the household (Jacoby, 2002). Analyzing a school feeding program in the 
Philippines, Jacoby (2002) finds virtually no intra-household reallocation of calories in response to 
the feeding programs on average, but reallocation was more pronounced in poorer households of 
the sample. Jacoby (2002) explains his finding by arguing that either the specific feeding program 
(snacks) is not substitutable with household food, or it is the reflection of a “labeling effect” as 
argued by Kooreman (2000) using Dutch data
1
In environments with low enrollment rates, perfectly targeting children who are enrolled 
might not be the best policy objective if one wants to reach most of the malnourished children.  
First, nutritionists generally believe that the window of opportunity for nutrition is during 
gestation and the first two years of life (Bhutta et al., 2008). Hence making sure that the food 
distributed reaches younger children may be important by its own right.  Second, parents may 
selectively enroll the healthiest and the best fed of their children (e.g. Alderman, Hoogeveen, and 
Rossi, 2009; Glewwe and Jacoby, 1995).  If so, it may be desirable to use THR to reach children 
who are not enrolled since they are likely to be the ones who need the intervention the most
.  
2
Starting from the 2005-2006 school year, after a reorganization of the operational zones of 
 .  
 
3 Program Description and Research Design  
School canteens which provide meals to the students attending school were first introduced 
in Burkina Faso by the Catholic Relief Service/Cathwell (a non-governmental organization) in the 
mid 1970’s in the aftermath of severe famine spells which affected the Sahel region of West 
Africa.  Dry take home rations are a more recent intervention, also initiated in Burkina Faso by 
the Catholic Relief Service/Cathwell; Students who attend school on a regular basis receive a food 
ration (flour) that they can bring back home each month. Take home rations are targeted to girls.  
                                                           
1 Using Dutch data, Kooreman (2000) shows that the marginal propensity to consume child clothing out of 
exogenous child benefits is larger than the marginal propensity to child clothing out of income from other sources. 
He then argues that households act this way because the benefits have been “labeled child benefits”.  
2 In Ghana, Glewwe & Jacoby (1995) find that malnourished children start school later and complete fewer years of 
school as compared to better nourished children. Therefore holding age constant, at any given time malnourished 
children are more likely to be out of school than well nourished children.  
   8 
the different actors, the World Food Program (WFP) assumed responsibility for all school 
nutrition programs (canteens and take home rations) in the Sahel region. Our study covers the region 
served by the WFP, and all new 46 new schools which were first opened in the academic 2005-
2006. As described in Figure 1, the experiment consisted in randomly assigning these schools to 
three groups (school canteens, take home rations and control group) after a baseline survey in 
June 2006.  The program was implemented in the following academic year (i.e.  2006-2007) and a 
follow up survey was fielded in June 2007 at the end of that academic year
3
In the two intervention groups, two different programs were implemented: school meals 
and THR. Under the school meals intervention, lunch was served each school day. The only 
requirement to have access to the meal is that the pupil be present. Both boys and girls were 
eligible for the school meals intervention. The THR stipulated that each month, each girl would 
receive 10 kg of cereal flour, conditional on a 90 percent attendance rate. Attendance records were 
maintained by the school administration, according to the standard policies applied by the Ministry 
of Education. In both cases, WFP has developed a quarterly delivery schedule, and the food 
staples were stored within the school.  In keeping with local policy, boys were not eligible for the 
THR program.  The teachers oversaw the administration of the program in collaboration with a 
representative of WFP. WFP has not reported any issues of concern with the program 
administration. However, because we did not run random checks on the program administration 
we cannot completely rule out problems that the WFP itself would not have known about.  
.  
We surveyed a random sample of 48 households around each school, making a total of 2208 
households, having a total of about 4140 school age children (i.e. aged between 6 and 15).  We 
collected information on household backgrounds, household wealth, school participation for all 
children, and anthropometric data. In both rounds of the survey, all school age children were asked 
to solve simple mathematical operations (addition, subtraction, multiplication and division). In the 
follow up round we administered formal cognitive tests, including the Raven’s Colored Progressive 
Matrices tests and forward and backward digit span tests in order to measure the program impact 
on cognitive development and short term memory.  In addition hemoglobin levels were taken for 
                                                           
3 The trial was originally schedule to last two years but the implementers were reluctant to continue the 
random assignment into the second year.   9 
all children younger than 16 and all women of reproductive age (between 15 and 49) in the follow 
up round.  The field work differs from many school feeding evaluation studies, not only in its 
randomized assignment of treatments, but also in that it surveyed children not in school.  
We summarize our key variables at baseline in table 1. The first three columns report the 
averages for the villages with school meals, take home rations and for the control villages. The last 
two columns (4 and 5) report the tests whether these variables are statistically different across 
treatment and control groups.  We consider child level variables, which include educational, and 
health  outcomes as well as socioeconomic characteristics, and household level variables which 
include the household head socioeconomic characteristics and household wealth.  
It is apparent that prior to treatment, the groups were similar on most variables 
including  enrollment, child health and nutritional status, household and socioeconomic 
characteristics.  Out of the 86 differences reported in columns 4 and 5, there are 5 instances where 
the estimated differences are statistically significant.  Overall, we conclude that the random 
assignment of villages to treatment and control groups was reasonably successful.  
These summary statistics also show that these villages are characterized by low enrollment 
rate and poor child health. At the time of the baseline survey, 28 percent of children in the school 
meals villages, 24 percent in the take home villages and 24 percent in the control villages were 
enrolled in schools
4
On the math tests, children scored less than 2 points which correspond to getting half the 
answers correct. The anthropometric data point to severe food shortage, with weight-for-age and 
height-for-age 2 standard deviations below the reference population
.  In both treatment and control villages, only a small fraction (about 17 
percent) of those children who are enrolled has access to all the required books.  If this is any 
indication of the learning environment, one could conjecture that other school inputs are 
constraining as well.  
5,6
                                                           
4 As previously noted, these differences are not statistically significant as shown in columns 4 and 5. 
5  We use the World Health Organization Child Growth Standards Package (WHO Multicentre Growth 
Reference Study Group, 2006). 
6 As previously noted, these differences are not statistically significant as shown in columns 4 and 5. 
. The figures in table 2 (top 
panel)  indicate that prior to the treatment, more than half of children were underweight or   10 
stunted, and about one third were wasted. Table 3 provides similar measures taken from the 2003 
Demographic and Health Survey (Institut National de la Statistique et de la Démographie and 
ORC Macro, 2004) which is the most recent available national survey at the time of our study.  It 
can be seen that child malnutrition is widespread, and the northern region (which includes our 
study area) is worse  off than most  other regions. Together, these figures indicate that these 
households are facing severe constraints on nutrition and one could expect significant gains from 
the program.  
 
4 Empirical Strategy 
The study uses an experimental, prospective randomized design in which villages are 
randomly assigned to treatment and control groups and data are collected before the interventions 
are rolled out and after the interventions have been implemented (Burges, 1995; Duflo, 
Glennerster and Kremer,  2008).  Our  identification strategy relies entirely on the random 
assignment of the villages to treatment and control groups.  Because of this random assignment 
the estimated program impact has a causal  interpretation. Our main assumption is that the 
outcomes of interest would have remained identical across these groups if the program has not been 
implemented. Therefore differences observed across the groups in the follow up survey can be 
attributed to the program.  
Because the program was offered at the village level, we estimate the average intent to treat  
(AIT) effect, that is, the impact of the program, on average, for all children in a given age range 
within a village whether or not all children in the village were receiving the treatment.  This 
estimate measures the average program impact on eligible individuals (i.e. the impact of the 
intervention instead of the impact of the treatment), and is relevant for two reasons. First, since in 
practice policy makers have no influence on program participation, AIT is relevant for policy 
analysis.  Second, AIT provides a lower bound for average treatment on the treated (ATT) under 
the assumption that the program impact on non participants in treatment groups is lower than its 
effect on compliers.  
To estimate the AIT we use children in the control villages as the counterfactual group, 
with the assumption that control villages are not impacted by the program.  We measure the   11 
program effect as the difference between the potential outcome (y1i) for children in a treated village 
(Ti = 1) in the presence of the treatment and the potential outcome (y0i) for children in a treated 
villages in the absence of the treatment.  
 
 
AIT  = E (y1i |Ti  = 1) − E (y0i |Ti  = 1)                                                                                         (1)       
However, since we do not observe the potential outcome for children in a treated village in the  
absence of the treatment, (y0i ), we use children in control villages (Ti  = 0) as the counterfactual. We  
assume that the potential outcome for children in a treated village in the absence of the treatment  
would be the same as the potential outcome for children in the absence of the treatment in control  
villages, or  
 
 
E (y1i |Ti  = 1) = E (y0i |Ti  = 0)                                                                                                       (2) 
 
Therefore, the AIT is given by  
 
 
AIT  = E (y1i |Ti  = 1) − E (y0i |Ti  = 0)                                                                                         (3)   
Given that we have both a baseline and a follow up surveys, we use a difference-in-differences 
(DID) specification to estimate the program impact.  
 
 
Yit = β0+β1Ti+β2Ti*F+β3F+β4Xit+µit                                                                                                                           (4)   
Where yi is the outcome of interest measured at the child level, Ti is the treatment indicator, Xi is 
a vector of child characteristics (e.g. gender, age), and F indicates the follow up survey. The impact 
o f  t h e  p r o g r a m  i s  g i v e n  b y  β 2. The analysis then compares age cohorts rather than changes in 
individuals over a panel.  
Our identification strategy could be weakened if control communities are indirectly 
affected by the program.  For example, there could be cross over in which households in control 
villages have their children attend school in treatment villages so that they gain access to the 
program. Also households in the program villages could chose to foster in children from villages   12 
without the programs.  The first type of crossover would lead to an underestimation of the impact 
while the latter could bias the measured effects upwards.  
 
5 Estimation Results and Discussion 
 
5.1. Enrollment 
Table 4 reports the program impact on new enrollments.  By new enrollments, we mean 
children who are entering school for the first time. The first three columns show the estimation 
results for children aged between 6 and 15 years. New enrollment increased by 6.2 percentage 
points overall and by 5.6 percentage points for girls in villages which were randomly selected to 
receive THR.  New enrollment for girls increased by 4.9 percentage points in villages that received 
school meals. The main insight from this table is that both interventions were successful in increasing 
new enrollment. However, the impact is confined to younger children. This may reflect the fact that 
the program only ran for one academic year and older children may not be able to register.  It is 
worth noting also that there is no evidence that THR targeting girls crowds out boys registration. 
  
 
5.2 Learning outcomes  
To assess how the interventions impacted learning outcomes, four simple arithmetic 
questions were asked to each child between 5 and 15. The enumerator recorded whether the answer 
was right and the time the child took to answer the question.  There are two main reasons one 
would expect a positive impact on learning outcomes.  First, if more children enroll because of 
the interventions, then one would expect the average learning outcome to increase (assuming that 
schooling has a positive impact on learning). Second, for children  who are enrolled, the 
interventions may improve learning outcomes through regular attendance and by reducing short 
term hunger the interventions would increase children’s ability to focus while in the classroom 
(e.g. Pollit, 1995).  Our approach relies on the observation that even with simple questions on 
math skills, it is still possible to find some variation among the population (Yamauchi, 2008).  
The maximum time allotted was 120 seconds, and in the data we recoded all incorrect   13 
answers and non-response to 125 seconds. The results are reported in tables 5 and 6 for all children 
between age 6 and 12.  In table 6, we report the time each child took to answer.  Overall there 
was a 22 seconds gain for girls in school meals villages.  From columns 6 and 9, it can be seen 
that these gains in time are confined to older girls in school meals villages (13 to 15 years old), as 
these girls took 54 seconds less than the control group to complete the exercise. We do not, however, 
see any significant impact on boys. It is important to remind that our estimation strategy yields 
average intent to treat (AIT) effects. 
A potentially interesting question is why the effects for older boys in the school meals 
villages in table 5 are negative and statistically significant.  At this point, we do not have an 
explanation.  However, similar negative impacts on learning outcomes have been encountered in 
Northern Uganda by Adelman et al. (2008).  Likewise Grantham-McGregor, Chang, and Walket 
(1998) have identified a negative impact of school breakfast on learning outcomes in Jamaica that 
they have associated with school level organization.  In particular, they have remarked that 





5.3 Cognitive Development  
During the follow up survey children between 5 and 15 were administered the WISC and 
Raven’s progressive matrices tests, and a digital span test.  The WISC and Raven tests were 
originally developed by Raven in 1936. The test asks candidates to identify the missing segment 
required to complete a larger pattern. The digit span test assesses the number of digits a child can 
retain and recall. Hence the forward digit span test can be seen as a measure of short term or working 
memory.  
Since these tests were not administered during the baseline, we rely on the differences 
between  treatment and control villages in the follow up assuming that the differences at the 
baseline would have been minimal. The estimations results are presented in tables 7 for the WISC and 
Raven’s and in table 8 for the digit span tests. In each case the outcome variable is the child’s total   14 
score. The results indicate that, looking at AIT, the interventions did not produce any discernible 
impact on these outcomes. In general cognitive abilities are more likely to be influenced by 
interventions which target children less than two years old when the brain is still forming 
(Bhutta et al., 2008).  Therefore, it is not necessarily surprising that these interventions which 
target school age children do not produce any discernible impact.  
 
5.4 Absenteeism  
Absenteeism is measured by the number of school days missed in May by each student as 
reported by the survey respondent.  Hence, a negative coefficient indicates that children exposed 
to the program missed fewer days in May whereas a positive coefficient indicates that children 
exposed to the program missed more days in May.  We show the estimation results in table 9.  The 
sample is restricted to children who were enrolled in school at the time of the surveys.  The results 
indicate that compared to the control group, students who were receiving school meals missed on 
average .7 (significant) days more and students who were receiving the take home rations missed 
.4 (not significant) days more, out of an estimated 20 school days in May. These results are driven 
by the program impact on girls.  From column (2), it is apparent that the school meals program 
did not affect boy’s absenteeism significantly. Column (3) reveals that compared to the control 
group, girls who received school meals or the THR missed 1 day more.  
Taken at face value, these results suggest the program had no impact on boys’ absenteeism 
and led to relatively more absenteeism among girls.  One can imagine a scenario where increased 
enrollment due to SFPs is accompanied by more absenteeism. Such an explanation would be related 
to household strategic behavior.  Consider two identical households A and B where A is the 
treated and B is the control.  Each household has two school age girls.  Absent of the program one 
girl is enrolled and the other is in charge of the household chores.  With the program, household 
A enrolls both girls.  Without an active labor market and if the household is labor constrained 
or child labor is complement to adult labor (Edmonds, 2008; Diamond and Fayed, 1998; Ray, 
2000,)  it is plausible that at least one girl in household A will miss school sometimes whereas the 
only girl who is enrolled in household B does not have to miss school. Specifically, as long as each 
girl in household A attends enough school to qualify for the THR, household A is still better off in   15 
terms of welfare. The same reasoning can be made for the school meals, although in this case there 
is not a cut off  level of attendance  for benefits. When registration fees fall below a certain 
threshold, it is optimal for the household to register all her children and have them attend school 
only those times when the household values the school meals more than the child labor.  Either 
way, absenteeism conditional on enrollment is likely to be higher with the program than without 
the program.  
Overall it is plausible that with the program children who would have stayed out of school 
are enrolled but some of them attend less regularly. We can use the number of school age children 
(6-15) to empirically test this conjecture. We consider the presence of other (other than the 
student) children between 6 and 15 years old in the household at the time of the survey, 
independently of whether or not those other children were enrolled themselves.  The number of 
children between 6-15 years old can be considered as given in the short term, and could not 
influenced by the program during the relatively short period it has been in place.  To assess the 
effects of household labor supply, we construct three groups of households based on the number of 
children in the household and estimate the program impact (ATT) on absenteeism for each group.  
The estimation results are reported in table 10.  Columns 1-3 show the results for households 
with no or at most one child in addition to the student (column 1), those with two or three 
children in addition to the student (column 2), and those with four or more children in addition to 
the student (column 3), respectively. We repeat the same regressions in columns 4-6 restricting the 
sample to younger students (i.e.  6-12 years old). Consistent with our conjecture, for households 
with at most one child in addition to the students (columns 1 and 4), the intervention has 
increased  absenteeism for more than a full day compared to the control group. There is no 
significant effect for households with 2 or 3 children (columns 2 and 4). For households with 4 or 
more children in addition to the student (columns 3 and 6), THR has lead to a reduction of the 
number of days missed (decreased absenteeism) by about 1.4 day for all students (column 3) and 
by about 1.7 days for younger students (column 6).  
 
5.5 Child labor 
Tables 11 to 16 look at the average intent to treat (AIT) impact of the interventions on   16 
child labor. The survey asked whether a child participated in a specific task during the last week 
the school was open.  Girls living in THR villages were 9 percentage points less likely to 
participate in farm labor or in productive non-farm labor (tables 11 and 12). The impact is in 
general larger for girls, and is confined to girls who are 6 to 12 years old.  These results are 
consistent with the observation that the take home rations targeted girls exclusively. Girls in the 
school meals villages were less likely to tend for their younger siblings (table 15), an activity that 
the social organization usually bestows onto young girls. However, girls 6-12 who benefited 
from the program, especially in the THR villages, were likely to be more involved in domestic 
activities such as fetching water, fetching woods and other household chores, as can be seen in 
tables 13, 14 and 16.  
Overall, the interventions did not eliminate child labor, but instead altered the 
allocation of child labor (especially among girls) away from productive activities and more 







5.6 Nutritional Status 
Table 17 shows the program impact (AIT) on the nutritional status of children less than 5 
years old.  We report the results for children between 6 and 60 months old and for children 
between 12 and 60 months old.  For THR villages, a child is defined as being in a treatment 
household if there is at least one school age girl (6-12 years old) in the household whether or not 
she actually attended
7
In villages which received take home rations, weight-for-age increased by .36 standard 
deviations (significant at the 5% level) and weight-for-height increased by .29 standards deviations 
(although not statistically significant) compared to the controls.  In the last three columns we 
.  
                                                           
7 Since THR targeted girls only, a household without a school age girl would not have been eligible.   17 
restrict the sample to children between 12 and 60 months old. It can be seen that the program impact 
increases  both in magnitude and in statistical significance: .38 standard deviations increase for 
weight-for-age (significant at the 5% level) and .33 increase in for weight-for-height (significant at 
the 10% level).  In contrast school meals did not have any discernable impact. Furthermore, there 
is no significant impact on height-for-age.  This latter result is expected since height-for-age is 
more a long run measure of child nutritional status which cannot be influenced in a relatively 
short period of time and which reflects breastfeeding and weaning practices as much as 
household food availability.  
  Unless parents reallocate food within the household away from children who have access 
to school meals and towards children who are not in school, one would not expect school meals 
to have any impact on children who are not in school, especially if parents do not reallocate food 
away from the children who have access to school meals as observed by (Jacoby, 2002).  On the 
other hand the significant impact of THR on younger children who are not in school warrants two 
observations. First, food that comes from THR is not used exclusively for the child who has access 
to the program but is accessible to other household members as well.  Hence, while school meals 
target precisely the child who is in school, THR have positive spillovers for younger children. 
Second, for a relatively marginal food transfer to have such a strong effect in a relatively short 
period of time, it must be the case that these households were severely food constrained.  
In table 18 we report the program impact on the nutritional status of school age children. 
We use body mass index for age (BMI) and weight-for-age, both expressed in z-scores based on 
the reference tables provided by de Onis et al. (2007)
8
                                                           
8 In the reference tables reported by de Onis et al. (2007), BMI-for-age is defined over the age range of 6 to 19 years 
of age, and weight-for-age is defined over 6 to 10 years of age.  
 
. It can be seen that the program did not have 
any significant impact on BMI, although there is a marginal gains in weight-for-age for 6-10 
years old (column 7).  
Table 19 shows hemoglobin levels taken during the second round of the survey.  
Assuming that hemoglobin levels at baseline would not have been different across treatment 
and control groups once age and gender were adequately controlled for, in keeping with the 
randomization our estimated program impact (AIT) can be interpreted as causal.    18 
The first three columns show the estimation results for children 6 to 15 years old.  Column  
one shows the results for the entire subsample of this age range and columns two and three show  
the results for boys and girls separately.  In columns 4-6, we repeat the analysis for children aged  
between 6 and 12 years. Column 7 shows the results for women of reproductive age, i.e. between 16  
and 49 years.  It is apparent that the program did not have any significant impact on hemoglobin  
levels.  Nevertheless, it can be seen that the program impact is generally larger under THR, and  
the standard errors are smaller in relative terms. Moreover, comparing columns 1-3 to columns 4-6,  
it can be seen that the impact on younger children is relatively larger. This is consistent with our  
previous finding that the interventions raised enrollment of younger children the most. 
Furthermore, while THR have relatively a larger impact, it is surprising that the impact of 
school meals is almost confined to younger boys as can be seen from comparing columns 5-6.  
This could be an indication that food redistribution within the household tends to favor boys over 
girls. However, these interpretations must be taken with caution since the  estimates  are not 




In this paper, we have used a prospective randomized design to assess the impact of two 
school  feeding schemes on educational and health outcomes of children from low income 
households in northern rural Burkina Faso.  We considered two programs: school meals which 
provide lunch in school, and take-home rations which provide girls with 10 kg of cereal flour each 
month, conditional on 90 percent attendance rate.  Because we can rely on a baseline and on a 
follow up surveys, we were able to use difference in difference regressions to estimate the impact 
of the program.  Moreover, because we have a randomized experiment, we can interpret the 
estimated impact as causal.  
 
After  the  program  ran  for  one  academic  year,  we  found  that  both  school  feeding  
schemes  increased girls’ enrollment by 5 to 6 percentage points. For younger siblings of   19 
beneficiaries, aged between 12 and 60 months who were not in school, take home rations have 
increased weight-for-age by .38 standard deviations and weight-for-height by .33 standard 
deviations. We do not find, however, a significant impact on academic performances and the 
average impact on attendance is counter-intuitive in the sense that the children who were exposed to 
the interventions have higher absenteeism.  We argue that the increased enrollment could be 
accompanied by higher absenteeism rates if there is no an active labor market and households are 
labor constrained and/or child labor is complementary to adult labor.  We show that the 
interventions caused absenteeism to increase in household who are low in child labor supply while 
absenteeism decreased for households which have a relatively large child labor supply. This in 
turn explains that we did not observe strong impacts on learning outcomes. 
Overall, our results show that school feeding programs  in this specific context of 
agricultural households without an active labor market can increase enrollment, but may fail to 
improve attendance and academic performance for a larger number of children. This calls for more 
investigation of the circumstances under which school feeding programs could increase enrollment 
and improve academic performance, and a more direct comparison of this type of conditional “in 
kind” transfer with conditional cash transfers.    20 
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Figure 1: Experimental design 
 
 
45 schools newly opened in 
2005-2006 in the Sahel 
Province
School Meals:
All children (boys and girls) 
attending school on that day.
In 15 schools
Take Home Rations:
10kg flour/month, Girls only, 




No school feeding program in 
2006-2007
In 14 schools  24 
  
Table 1: Key Variables at Baseline 
 
      (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Variable    Meals  THR  Control  Difference with control 
               Meals  THR 
             
Child level variables 
Enrolled    0.281  0.241  0.243  0.039  -0.001 
    [0.033]   [0.032]   [0.025]   [0.042]   [0.041]  
Math answers    1.823  1.923  1.818  0.005  0.106 
    [0.113]   [0.143]   [0.132]   [0.173]   [0.194]  
Math time-adjusted  180.528  171.661  183.433  -2.905  -11.772 
    [6.070]   [6.328]   [6.913]   [9.199]   [9.372]  
Days missed in May  0.513  0.713  1.276  -0.763*  -0.563 
    [0.165]   [0.189]   [0.382]   [0.416]   [0.426]  
Child labor (any)    0.848  0.87  0.852  -0.003  0.018 
    [0.017]   [0.019]   [0.018]   [0.025]   [0.026]  
Child productive labor  0.65  0.637  0.603  0.047  0.034 
    [0.033]   [0.031]   [0.034]   [0.047]   [0.046]  
  Farm labor  0.585  0.595  0.574  0.011  0.021 
    [0.042]   [0.032]   [0.039]   [0.057]   [0.050]  
  Non farm labor  0.292  0.236  0.163  0.129**  0.073 
    [0.039]   [0.055]   [0.032]   [0.050]   [0.063]  
Household chores    0.643  0.656  0.686  -0.043  -0.030 
    [0.022]   [0.033]   [0.029]   [0.037]   [0.044]  
  Cooking  0.334  0.315  0.344  -0.009  -0.028 
    [0.020]   [0.023]   [0.024]   [0.031]   [0.033]  
  Fetch water  0.467  0.493  0.527  -0.059  -0.034 
    [0.027]   [0.041]   [0.039]   [0.048]   [0.057]  
  Fetch wood  0.359  0.396  0.36  -0.001  0.035 
    [0.022]   [0.032]   [0.036]   [0.043]   [0.048]  
 
Tend 
youngsters  0.237  0.198  0.186  0.052  0.012 
    [0.028]   [0.024]   [0.031]   [0.042]   [0.039]  
 
Other hh 
chores  0.391  0.388  0.413  -0.022  -0.025 
    [0.015]   [0.026]   [0.025]   [0.029]   [0.036]  
weight (kg)    23.135  23.397  22.747  0.388  0.650 
    [0.682]   [0.706]   [0.631]   [0.929]   [0.947]  
height (cm)    125.627  125.542  124.941  0.686  0.601 
    [1.020]   [1.315]   [1.362]   [1.702]   [1.893]  
Body mass index    14.378  14.569  14.331  0.047  0.238 
    [0.269]   [0.192]   [0.201]   [0.336]   [0.278]  
Weight-for-age (6-60 months)  -2.202  -2.521  -2.394  0.192  -0.126 
    [0.172]   [0.159]   [0.178]   [0.248]   [0.238]  
Height-for-age (6-60 months)  -2.351  -2.086  -2.317  -0.034  0.231 
    [0.152]   [0.111]   [0.146]   [0.211]   [0.184]  
Weight-for-height (6-60 months)  -0.786  -1.125  -0.903  0.117  -0.222   25 
    [0.143]   [0.108]   [0.156]   [0.212]   [0.190]  
Registration Fees     261.58  543.478  319.667  -58.086  223.812 
(CFA Francs)    [79.570]   [154.603]   [85.403]   [116.727]   [176.623]  
Education Expenses    2351.689  3012.625  2556.167  -204.477  456.459 
(CFA Francs)    [334.717]   [476.950]   [291.944]   [444.147]   [559.207]  
PTA Fees    718.937  699.666  801.5  -82.563  -101.834 
(CFA Francs)    [74.925]   [92.651]   [75.513]   [106.377]   [119.526]  
Child is boy    0.495  0.52  0.504  -0.010  0.016 
    [0.008]   [0.017]   [0.012]   [0.014]   [0.021]  
Age    9.783  9.793  9.837  -0.054  -0.044 
    [0.069]   [0.081]   [0.076]   [0.103]   [0.111]  
Father has some formal ed.  0.014  0.024  0.026  -0.012  -0.002 
    [0.005]   [0.012]   [0.008]   [0.009]   [0.014]  
Father has some Koran ed.  0.169  0.164  0.202  -0.034  -0.038 
    [0.041]   [0.040]   [0.077]   [0.087]   [0.086]  
Mother has some formal ed.  0.004  0.011  0.011  -0.007  0.000 
    [0.003]   [0.007]   [0.004]   [0.005]   [0.008]  
Mother has some Koran ed.  0.029  0.06  0.107  -0.078  -0.048 
    [0.016]   [0.020]   [0.068]   [0.070]   [0.071]  
Maternal orphan    0.032  0.029  0.024  0.008  0.005 
    [0.009]   [0.010]   [0.006]   [0.011]   [0.012]  
Paternal orphan    0.04  0.07  0.055  -0.015  0.015 
    [0.009]   [0.010]   [0.016]   [0.018]   [0.019]  
             
Household level variables 
Head age    42.881  45.669  45.629  -2.748*  0.040 
    [1.052]   [1.190]   [1.223]   [1.613]   [1.707]  
Head is male    0.976  0.978  0.978  -0.002  0.000 
    [0.005]   [0.007]   [0.006]   [0.008]   [0.010]  
Head is Mossi    0.129  0.094  0.101  0.028  -0.007 
    [0.064]   [0.045]   [0.048]   [0.079]   [0.066]  
Head is Fulani    0.389  0.46  0.411  -0.023  0.049 
    [0.090]   [0.101]   [0.102]   [0.136]   [0.144]  
Head is of Blacksmith descent  0.041  0.027  0.02  0.021  0.007 
    [0.021]   [0.010]   [0.006]   [0.021]   [0.011]  
Head is of Noble descent  0.377  0.37  0.557  -0.180  -0.187* 
    [0.084]   [0.071]   [0.075]   [0.113]   [0.103]  
Head is of Captive descent  0.35  0.391  0.193  0.157  0.198* 
    [0.088]   [0.085]   [0.058]   [0.105]   [0.103]  
Head is Muslim    0.967  0.978  0.987  -0.020  -0.009 
    [0.018]   [0.012]   [0.007]   [0.019]   [0.014]  
Household asset value (1000 CFA)  66.522  92.109  78.966  -12.443  13.143 
      [12.659]   [19.772]   [6.027]   [14.020]   [20.670]  
 
Robust standard errors in brackets.  
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%  
1 USD = +/- 500 CFA Francs. 
Mossi and Fulani are two ethnic groups from the region.  











Table 2:  Percentage of children two standard deviation below 
the median (z-scores:  children between 6 and 60 months old)  
(1)       (2)       (3) 
Weight-for-age    Weight-for-Height    Height-for-Age 
Baseline 
 
School meals  52.6  29.5  59.9 
Take Home Rations  56.2  32.3  60.0 




School meals  42.8  20.6  58.9 
Take Home Rations  42.8  19.5  53.3 
Control  42.7  23.8  55.6 
 
 
Table 3:  Percentage of children two standard deviation below the 
median in rural Burkina Faso, 2003 (z-scores: children between 0 and 
60 months old) 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Height-for-age    Weight-for-height    Weight-for-age  N 
Region 
 
Ouagadougou (area)  16.4  12.4  17.9  486 
North  41.7  19.4  41.8  1587 
East  47.2  18.7  38.4  2147 
West  35.7  19.3  37.6  2328 
Central/South  35.1  19.2  38.4  1722 
Total Rural  41.4  19.7  40.3  7166 
 
Source:  ORC Macro, 2008.  MEASURE DHS. 
STATcompiler.  http://www.measuredhs.com, August 1 2008.    27 
 
Table 4: Program Impact on New Enrollment  
 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
  6-15 years old  6-12 years old 
 
13-15 years old 
  All  Boys  Girls  All  Boys  Girls  All  Boys  Girls 
 Meals*Follow-up  0.017  -0.015  0.049  0.012  -0.034  0.064  0.025  0.059  -0.005 
  [0.019]  [0.028]  [0.025]**  [0.023]  [0.034]  [0.031]**  [0.025]  [0.042]  [0.028] 
Rations*Follow-up  0.062  n.a.  0.056  0.065  n.a.  0.065  0.049  n.a.  0.029 
  [0.021]***  n.a.  [0.025]**  [0.026]**  n.a.  [0.031]**  [0.023]**  n.a.  [0.023] 
Follow-up  -0.153  -0.16  -0.147  -0.178  -0.178  -0.179  -0.066  -0.092  -0.042 
  [0.014]***  [0.021]***  [0.019]***  [0.017]***  [0.025]***  [0.023]***  [0.020]***  [0.035]***  [0.021]** 
Girl  -0.041      -0.045      -0.037     
  [0.009]***    [0.011]***    [0.013]***     
Constant  0.177  0.173  0.137  0.191  0.186  0.145  0.069  0.045  0.057 
  [0.014]***  [0.022]***  [0.016]***  [0.016]***  [0.025]***  [0.017]***  [0.014]***  [0.028]  [0.018]*** 
Observations  6587  2537  4050  5097  1967  3130  1490  570  920 
R-squared  0.12  0.14  0.11  0.11  0.15  0.09  0.1  0.13  0.14 
 
Robust standard errors in brackets  
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1% Dependent variable is whether the child started school in survey year.  
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Table 5: Program Impact on Learning Outcomes: Answers to Math Questions  
 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
  6-15 years old  6-12 years old  13-15 years old 
  All  Boys  Girls  All  Boys  Girls  All  Boys  Girls 
Meals* 
Follow-up  -0.038  -0.152  0.087  0.028  -0.077  0.124  -0.300  -0.505  -0.131 
  [0.070]  [0.099]  [0.100]  [0.079]  [0.111]  [0.112]  [0.153]*  [0.215]**  [0.228] 
Rations*  -0.078  n.a.  -0.042  -0.084  n.a.  -0.063  -0.054  n.a.  0.044 
Follow-up  [0.092]  n.a.  [0.105]  [0.099]  n.a.  [0.113]  [0.244]  n.a.  [0.276] 
Follow-up  0.044  0.076  0.005  0.040  0.061  0.018  0.073  0.106  -0.034 
  [0.049]  [0.071]  [0.070]  [0.055]  [0.079]  [0.078]  [0.109]  [0.157]  [0.161] 
Girl  -0.050      -0.045      -0.098     
  [0.034]      [0.038]      [0.073]     
Constant  0.554  0.496  0.545  0.533  0.474  0.533  2.933  3.053  2.802 
  [0.052]***  [0.080]***  [0.063]***  [0.056]***  [0.085]***  [0.065]***  [0.120]***  [0.173]***  [0.156]*** 
Observations  5548  2302  3246  4467  1826  2641  1081  476  605 
R-squared  0.39  0.42  0.39  0.34  0.36  0.34  0.16  0.18  0.22 
 
 
Robust standard errors in brackets  
* Significant at 10%; **significant at 5%, *** significant at 1% Dependent variable is number of correct answers (varies from 0 to 4).  





   29 
 
Table 6: Program Impact on Learning Outcomes: Time Taken to Answers Math Questions  
 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
  6-15 years old  6-12 years old  13-15 years old 
  All  Boys  Girls  All  Boys  Girls  All  Boys  Girls 
Meals*Follow-up  -8.253  4.854  -21.635  -8.524  -2.432  -12.985  -12.374  34.066  -53.817 
  [7.066]  [9.997]  [10.015]**  [7.526]  [10.633]  [10.690]  [18.976]  [27.154]  [27.803]* 
Rations*  -4.669  n.a.  -8.263  -0.610  n.a.  0.833  -16.602  n.a.  -39.108 
Follow-up  [9.480]  n.a.  [10.716]  [9.798]  n.a.  [11.109]  [30.521]  n.a.  [34.490] 
Follow-up  6.616  2.491  10.545  2.237  3.294  0.823  22.276  2.091  45.857 
  [4.893]  [6.924]  [6.925]  [5.201]  [7.361]  [7.336]  [12.982]*  [18.671]  [19.069]** 
Girl  5.290  0.000  0.000  2.144  0.000  0.000  19.735  0.000  0.000 
  [3.352]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [3.588]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [8.749]**  [0.000]  [0.000] 
Constant  453.636  457.561  455.342  458.440  460.099  458.853  250.082  248.805  268.538 
  [4.922]***  [7.280]***  [5.932]***  [5.097]***  [7.590]***  [5.985]***  [14.178]***  [19.849]***  [18.464]*** 
Observations  5624  2323  3301  4541  1847  2694  1083  476  607 
R-squared  0.31  0.34  0.30  0.26  0.28  0.26  0.15  0.16  0.20 
 
 
Robust standard errors in brackets  
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1% Dependent variable is time taken to give a correct answer in second. Maximum 
time allowed is 120 seconds for each of the 4 questions. Wrong answer and no-answer are given 125 second.  
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Table 7: Program Impact on Cognitive Abilities: WISC and Raven Tests  
 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
  6-15 years old  6-12 years old  13-15 years old 
  All  Boys  Girls  All  Boys  Girls  All  Boys  Girls 
School Meals  0.222  -0.083  0.512  0.134  0.04  0.257  0.561  -0.807  1.242 
  [1.066]  [1.062]  [1.137]  [1.095]  [1.067]  [1.160]  [1.201]  [1.253]  [1.423] 
Dry Rations  -0.132  n.a.  -0.045  -0.2  n.a.  -0.179  0.086  n.a.  0.478 
  [1.222]  n.a.  [1.233]  [1.241]  n.a.  [1.258]  [1.455]  n.a.  [1.525] 
Girl  -0.046      -0.041      -0.13     
  [0.217]      [0.239]      [0.518]     
Constant  7.065  6.341  7.458  6.831  5.937  7.317  12.293  12.007  11.885 
  [1.544]***  [2.079]***  [1.545]***  [1.594]***  [2.092]***  [1.582]***  [1.844]***  [2.659]***  [2.020]*** 
Observations  2651  1057  1594  2078  841  1237  573  216  357 
R-squared  0.43  0.49  0.4  0.42  0.49  0.39  0.41  0.45  0.41 
 
 
Robust standard errors in brackets  
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%  
Dependent variable is number of correct answers of to WISC and Raven colored progressive matrices.  
Regressions also control for child age, orphanhood, parents education, ethnicity, religion and household assets (not reported).  Village fixed effects 
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Table 8: Program Impact on Cognitive Abilities: Forward and Backward Digit Spans  
 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
  6-15 years old  6-12 years old  13-15 years old 
  All  Boys  Girls  All  Boys  Girls  All  Boys  Girls 
School 
Meals  0.112  0.327  0.011  0.068  0.377  -0.094  0.369  0.149  0.457 
  [1.103]  [1.221]  [1.087]  [1.191]  [1.288]  [1.159]  [1.004]  [1.282]  [1.062] 
Dry Rations  -0.005  n.a.  -0.104  -0.213  n.a.  -0.351  0.836  n.a.  1.011 
  [0.948]  n.a.  [0.977]  [1.026]  n.a.  [1.054]  [0.949]  n.a.  [0.965] 
Girl  -0.142      -0.168      -0.178     
  [0.236]      [0.284]      [0.488]     
Constant  8.489  7.969  8.73  8.399  7.458  8.854  12.859  13.098  12.189 
  [1.885]***  [2.819]***  [1.676]***  [1.969]***  [2.917]**  [1.721]***  [2.021]***  [3.382]***  [1.962]*** 
Observations  2679  1076  1603  2095  853  1242  584  223  361 
R-squared  0.42  0.47  0.4  0.43  0.48  0.41  0.36  0.43  0.35 
 
Robust standard errors in brackets  
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%  
Dependent variable is number of correct answers of to backward and forward digital spans.  
Regressions also control for child age, orphanhood, parents education, ethnicity, religion and household assets (not reported).  Village fixed effects 
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Table 9: Program Impact on School Absenteeism  
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
  6-15 years old  6-12 years old  13-15 years old 
  All  Boys  Girls  All  Boys  Girls  All  Boys  Girls 
School Meals  0.659  0.26  1.012  0.706  0.345  0.982  0.098  -0.65  -0.701 
  [0.280]**  [0.399]  [0.353]***  [0.302]**  [0.442]  [0.366]***  [0.699]  [1.243]  [0.880] 
Dry Rations  0.369  n.a.  1.014  0.459  n.a.  1.042  -0.377  n.a.  -0.603 
  [0.287]  n.a.  [0.389]***  [0.310]  n.a.  [0.406]**  [0.870]  n.a.  [1.456] 
Follow-up  -0.987  -0.787  -1.107  -1.073  -0.892  -1.123  -0.298  0.151  0.823 
  [0.225]***  [0.285]***  [0.338]***  [0.249]***  [0.334]***  [0.355]***  [0.354]  [0.559]  [0.748] 
Girl  -0.057      -0.098      0.756     
  [0.097]      [0.104]      [0.381]**     
Constant  1.168  1.536  0.541  1.218  1.547  0.576  -0.112  -0.011  0.336 
  [0.332]***  [0.505]***  [0.225]**  [0.335]***  [0.514]***  [0.233]**  [0.497]  [0.763]  [0.477] 
Observations  1935  1116  819  1738  973  765  197  143  54 
R-squared  0.11  0.15  0.18  0.11  0.15  0.19  0.22  0.27  0.94 
 
 
Robust standard errors in brackets  
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1% Dependent variable number of days missed in May.  
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Table 10: Absenteeism and number of children  
 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
  All students  Students aged 6-12 
  Number of children other than student 
   0-1  2-3 
3 or 




Meals  1.478  0.189  -0.272  1.512  0.221  -0.235 
  [0.423]***  [0.534]  [0.406]  [0.449]***  [0.565]  [0.397] 
Dry Rations  1.245  0.268  -1.375  1.363  0.437  -1.653 
  [0.404]***  [0.428]  [0.697]**  [0.434]***  [0.454]  [0.764]** 
Follow-up  -1.652  -0.91  0.175  -1.788  -1.052  0.208 
  [0.387]***  [0.386]**  [0.245]  [0.421]***  [0.417]**  [0.293] 
Girl  0.023  0.02  -0.063  -0.047  -0.028  -0.075 
  [0.164]  [0.179]  [0.134]  [0.178]  [0.191]  [0.150] 
Constant  1.001  1.262  1.431  1.12  1.368  1.467 
  [0.380]***  [0.485]***  [0.732]*  [0.376]***  [0.493]***  [0.723]** 
Observations  568  830  537  511  747  480 
R-squared  0.29  0.12  0.19  0.32  0.13  0.22 
 
 
Robust standard errors in brackets  
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%  
Dependent variable number of days missed in May.  
Regressions also control for child age, orphanhood, parents education, ethnicity, religion, household assets and village fixed effects (not reported).  
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Table 11: Program Impact on Child Participation in Farm Labor  
 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
  6-15 years old  6-12 years old  13-15 years old 
  All  Boys  Girls  All  Boys  Girls  All  Boys  Girls 
School Meals  0.024  0.01  0.033  0.04  0.014  0.06  -0.034  0.01  -0.111 
  [0.025]  [0.032]  [0.037]  [0.029]  [0.038]  [0.042]  [0.045]  [0.046]  [0.080] 
Dry Rations  -0.045  n.a.  -0.089  -0.05  n.a.  -0.089  -0.044  n.a.  -0.118 
  [0.032]  n.a.  [0.037]**  [0.037]  n.a.  [0.042]**  [0.068]  n.a.  [0.084] 
Follow-up  0.087  0.047  0.13  0.075  0.041  0.114  0.133  0.071  0.21 
  [0.017]***  [0.023]**  [0.026]***  [0.020]***  [0.027]  [0.029]***  [0.032]***  [0.032]**  [0.056]*** 
Girl  -0.178      -0.176      -0.188     
  [0.012]***      [0.014]***      [0.022]***     
Constant  0.334  0.247  0.227  0.336  0.261  0.223  0.827  0.816  0.657 
  [0.022]***  [0.030]***  [0.027]***  [0.023]***  [0.033]***  [0.028]***  [0.033]***  [0.038]***  [0.045]*** 
Observations  6047  2462  3585  4757  1931  2826  1290  531  759 
R-squared  0.26  0.29  0.24  0.25  0.27  0.23  0.23  0.19  0.21 
 
Robust standard errors in brackets  
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%  
Dependent variable is whether child participated in any farm labor the week before the survey.  




   35 
 
 
Table 12: Program Impact on Child Participation in Non Farm Labor  
 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
  6-15 years old  6-12 years old  13-15 years old 
  All  Boys  Girls  All  Boys  Girls  All  Boys  Girls 
School Meals  -0.006  -0.022  0.007  -0.006  -0.021  0.003  0.009  -0.025  0.044 
  [0.023]  [0.033]  [0.033]  [0.026]  [0.037]  [0.036]  [0.054]  [0.077]  [0.079] 
Dry Rations  -0.074  n.a.  -0.090  -0.082  n.a.  -0.103  -0.043  n.a.  -0.031 
  [0.025]***  n.a.  [0.030]***  [0.028]***  n.a.  [0.033]***  [0.060]  n.a.  [0.071] 
Follow-up  0.073  0.059  0.088  0.083  0.065  0.104  0.030  0.034  0.013 
  [0.015]***  [0.022]***  [0.022]***  [0.017]***  [0.024]***  [0.024]***  [0.035]  [0.052]  [0.049] 
Girl  -0.028      -0.028      -0.030     
  [0.011]**      [0.013]**      [0.026]     
Constant  0.126  0.112  0.109  0.128  0.111  0.115  0.327  0.369  0.258 
  [0.018]***  [0.027]***  [0.020]***  [0.019]***  [0.028]***  [0.021]***  [0.035]***  [0.050]***  [0.041]*** 
Observations  6047  2462  3585  4757  1931  2826  1290  531  759 
R-squared  0.23  0.22  0.24  0.22  0.21  0.24  0.27  0.3  0.3 
 
Robust standard errors in brackets  
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%  
Dependent variable is whether child participated in any non farm labor the week before the survey.  
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Table 13: Program Impact on Child Participation in Fetching Water  
 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
  6-15 years old  6-12 years old  13-15 years old 
  All  Boys  Girls  All  Boys  Girls  All  Boys  Girls 
School 
Meals  0.049  0.017  0.084  0.045  0.000  0.102  0.071  0.077  0.073 
  [0.026]*  [0.036]  [0.036]**  [0.030]  [0.040]  [0.042]**  [0.054]  [0.079]  [0.068] 
Dry Rations  0.055  n.a.  0.096  0.058  n.a.  0.112  0.048  n.a.  0.075 
  [0.031]*  n.a.  [0.036]***  [0.036]  n.a.  [0.042]***  [0.056]  n.a.  [0.062] 
Follow-up  -0.031  0.004  -0.066  -0.043  0.001  -0.089  0.002  0.026  -0.025 
  [0.019]  [0.026]  [0.025]***  [0.021]**  [0.029]  [0.030]***  [0.037]  [0.056]  [0.046] 
Girl  0.330        0.311        0.403       
  [0.013]***        [0.014]***        [0.026]***       
Constant  0.075  0.160  0.347  0.082  0.158  0.342  0.445  0.435  0.865 
  [0.020]***  [0.028]***  [0.027]***  [0.022]***  [0.029]***  [0.028]***  [0.037]***  [0.061]***  [0.036]*** 
Observations  6047  2462  3585  4757  1931  2826  1290  531  759 
R-squared  0.24  0.19  0.20  0.22  0.17  0.19  0.30  0.28  0.14 
 
 
Robust standard errors in brackets  
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1% Dependent variable is whether child has fetched water the week before the 
survey.  
Regressions also control for child age, orphanhood, parents education, ethnicity, religion, household assets and village fixed effects (not reported).  
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Table 14: Program Impact on Child Participation in Fetching Wood  
 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
  6-15 years old  6-12 years old  13-15 years old 
  All  Boys  Girls  All  Boys  Girls  All  Boys  Girls 
School 
Meals  0.064  0.108  0.011  0.081  0.107  0.054  0.009  0.11  -0.13 
  [0.026]**  [0.033]***  [0.039]  [0.029]***  [0.037]***  [0.043]  [0.060]  [0.079]  [0.091] 
Dry Rations  0.056  n.a.  0.035  0.079  n.a.  0.072  -0.026  n.a.  -0.083 
  [0.033]*  n.a.  [0.039]  [0.037]**  n.a.  [0.043]*  [0.073]  n.a.  [0.087] 
Follow-up  -0.077  -0.1  -0.05  -0.096  -0.114  -0.081  -0.021  -0.05  0.034 
  [0.018]***  [0.024]***  [0.027]*  [0.020]***  [0.026]***  [0.030]***  [0.041]  [0.055]  [0.062] 
Girl  0.204      0.181      0.292     
  [0.013]***    [0.014]***    [0.029]***   
Constant  0.048  0.113  0.193  0.06  0.114  0.188  0.322  0.332  0.619 
  [0.019]**  [0.025]***  [0.025]***  [0.020]***  [0.026]***  [0.027]***  [0.040]***  [0.056]***  [0.049]*** 
Observations  6047  2462  3585  4757  1931  2826  1290  531  759 





Robust standard errors in brackets  
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1% Dependent variable is whether child has fetched wood the week before the 
survey.  
Regressions also control for child age, orphanhood, parents education, ethnicity, religion, household assets and village fixed effects (not reported).  
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Table 15: Program Impact on Child Participation in Tending for Younger Siblings  
 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
  6-15 years old  6-12 years old  13-15 years old 
  All  Boys  Girls  All  Boys  Girls  All  Boys  Girls 
School 
Meals  -0.041  0.004  -0.084  -0.055  -0.015  -0.081  -0.001  0.070  -0.110 
  [0.023]*  [0.025]  [0.037]**  [0.026]**  [0.030]  [0.042]*  [0.046]  [0.044]  [0.085] 
Dry Rations  -0.006  n.a.  0.009  -0.015  n.a.  -0.006  0.022  n.a.  0.051 
  [0.030]  n.a.  [0.036]  [0.035]  n.a.  [0.041]  [0.061]  n.a.  [0.077] 
Follow-up  0.001  0.011  -0.012  0.023  0.024  0.018  -0.078  -0.029  -0.121 
  [0.015]  [0.018]  [0.025]  [0.018]  [0.022]  [0.028]  [0.030]**  [0.031]  [0.054]** 
Girl  0.181      0.172      0.214     
  [0.011]***      [0.013]***      [0.023]***     
Constant  0.165  0.182  0.335  0.169  0.175  0.336  0.114  0.136  0.302 
  [0.019]***  [0.024]***  [0.027]***  [0.020]***  [0.025]***  [0.028]***  [0.030]***  [0.031]***  [0.046]*** 
Observations  6047  2462  3585  4757  1931  2826  1290  531  759 




Robust standard errors in brackets  
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1% Dependent variable is whether has tended youngsters the week before the survey.  
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Table 16: Program Impact on Child Participation in Other Household Chores  
 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
  6-15 years old  6-12 years old  13-15 years old 
  All  Boys  Girls  All  Boys  Girls  All  Boys  Girls 
School Meals  0.027  -0.002  0.044  0.028  -0.009  0.056  0.008  0.017  0.012 
  [0.022]  [0.024]  [0.036]  [0.026]  [0.027]  [0.042]  [0.042]  [0.052]  [0.066] 
Dry Rations  0.065  n.a.  0.116  0.055  n.a.  0.113  0.090  n.a.  0.110 
  [0.030]**  n.a.  [0.036]***  [0.035]  n.a.  [0.042]***  [0.057]  n.a.  [0.068] 
Follow-up  -0.051  -0.005  -0.092  -0.051  0.007  -0.100  -0.054  -0.042  -0.071 
  [0.016]***  [0.018]  [0.026]***  [0.019]***  [0.021]  [0.030]***  [0.030]*  [0.039]  [0.047] 
Girl  0.574      0.528      0.740     
  [0.011]***      [0.013]***      [0.021]***     
Constant  -0.066  0.114  0.373  -0.049  0.106  0.362  0.147  0.176  0.869 
  [0.020]***  [0.020]***  [0.028]***  [0.021]**  [0.021]***  [0.030]***  [0.031]***  [0.043]***  [0.036]*** 
Observations  6047  2462  3585  4757  1931  2826  1290  531  759 
R-squared  0.40  0.09  0.17  0.37  0.10  0.17  0.55  0.10  0.09 
 
Robust standard errors in brackets  
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%  
Dependent variable is whether child participated in other household chores the week before the survey.  
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Table 17: Program Impact on children (6 to 60 months old) nutritional status  
 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
  Children 6-60 months old  Children 12-60 months old 









  Age  Height  Age  Age  Height  Age 
School 
Meals  -0.219  0.005  -0.19  -0.172  0.062  -0.135 
  [0.129]*  [0.157]  [0.180]  [0.132]  [0.160]  [0.186] 
Dry Rations  0.355  0.291  -0.212  0.376  0.333  -0.189 
  [0.153]**  [0.181]  [0.209]  [0.157]**  [0.187]*  [0.216] 
Follow-up  0.547  0.161  0.298  0.516  0.166  0.201 
  [0.093]***  [0.112]  [0.133]**  [0.094]***  [0.114]  [0.137] 
Girl  0.138  0.121  0.116  0.148  0.109  0.123 
  [0.056]**  [0.065]*  [0.075]  [0.058]**  [0.067]  [0.079] 
Constant  -1.65  -0.098  -0.792  -2.077  -0.437  -0.749 
  [0.277]***  [0.337]  [0.358]**  [0.525]***  [0.625]  [0.758] 
Observations  3422  3085  3079  3200  2890  2876 
R-squared  0.15  0.08  0.08  0.16  0.09  0.08 
 
Robust standard errors in brackets  
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%  
Dependent variables are z-scores of weight-for-age, weight-for-height and height-for-age.  
Regressions also control for child age, orphanhood, parents education, ethnicity, religion, household assets and village fixed effects (not reported).  
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Table 18: Program Impact on nutritional status of school age children  
 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
  BMI-for-age (z-scores)  weight-for-age (z-scores) 
  6-15 years old  6-12 years old  6-10 years old 
  All  Boys  Girls  All  Boys  Girls  All  Boys  Girls 
School Meals  0.022  0.003  -0.024  0.082  0.166  -0.011  0.225  0.235  0.1 
  [0.088]  [0.135]  [0.121]  [0.118]  [0.189]  [0.167]  [0.112]**  [0.172]  [0.160] 
Dry Rations  -0.124  n.a.  -0.106  -0.152  n.a.  -0.172  0.153  n.a.  0.087 
  [0.110]  n.a.  [0.123]  [0.153]  n.a.  [0.174]  [0.121]  n.a.  [0.165] 
Follow up  0.276  0.341  0.247  0.273  0.286  0.295  0.03  -0.041  0.11 
  [0.062]***  [0.096]***  [0.086]***  [0.084]***  [0.135]**  [0.122]**  [0.080]  [0.123]  [0.115] 
Girl  0.075      0.102      0.135     
  [0.049]      [0.071]      [0.057]**     
Constant  -1.161  -1.169  -1.153  -1.197  -1.158  -1.124  -2.308  -2.328  -2.232 
  [0.064]***  [0.098]***  [0.080]***  [0.075]***  [0.108]***  [0.087]***  [0.062]***  [0.087]***  [0.085]*** 
Observations  5290  2073  3217  3269  1277  1992  3884  1800  2084 
R-squared  0.520  0.610  0.610  0.590  0.660  0.670  0.63  0.71  0.72 
 
Standard errors in brackets  
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%  
Dependent variables are z-scores of BMI (columns 1-6) and z-scores of weight for age (columns 7-9). Regressions also control for child age, 
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Table 19: Program Impact on hemoglobin levels  
 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
  Children aged 6-15  Children aged 6-12  Women  
   All  Boys  Girls  All  Boys  Girls  16-49 
School Meals  0.081  0.138  0.036  0.118  0.249  0.006  -0.057 
  [0.173]  [0.175]  [0.189]  [0.172]  [0.176]  [0.189]  [0.151] 
Dry rations  0.069  n.a.  0.055  0.133  n.a.  0.089  -0.008 
  [0.192]  n.a.  [0.203]  [0.196]  n.a.  [0.208]  [0.129] 
Girl  0.003      -0.022       
  [0.050]      [0.058]       
Constant  10.703  10.832  10.600  10.729  10.794  10.646  11.082 
  [0.242]***  [0.256]***  [0.234]***  [0.239]***  [0.251]***  [0.241]***  [0.267]*** 
Observations  2518.000  1018.000  1500.000  2032.000  831.000  1201.000  2211.000 
R-squared  0.09  0.11  0.09  0.10  0.13  0.10  0.03 
 
Robust standard errors in brackets  
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1% Dependent variable is measured level of hemoglobin in ml per liter.  
Regressions also control for child age, orphanhood, parents education, ethnicity, religion, household assets and village fixed effects (not reported).  
 
 